Rethinking the Pornography Debate: Some Ontological Considerations by Mui, Constance
RETHINKING TUE PORNOGRAPHY DEBATE:
SOME ONTOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
In feminist scholarship, the philosophical debate over
pomography has been a debate over censorship and freedorn of
expression. On one side are anti-pomography feminists, such as
Robin Morgan, Catharine MacKinnon, and Andrea Dworkin,
who endorse some form of censorship on grounds that
pomography hanns wornen and society. Morgan has argued that,
UPomography is the theory, and rape is the practice"l, while
MacKinnon and Dworkin have authored city ordinances to
outlaw pomography as a violation of women's civil rights.
According to these anti-pomography feminists, pomography
contributes to the culture of physical and psychological violence
that wornen experience everyday.
On the other side of the debate are the anti-censorship
feminists, including Linda Williams, Varda Burstyn, and Carole
Vance. Observing the uncomfortable alliance between
anti-pomography feminists and the Christian Right,
anti-censorship feminists challenge the assumption of normal
sexuality that underlies their.opponents' rejection ofpomography
as perversion. While many anti-censorship feminists would
concede that most pomography is informed by the ideology of
patriarchal power, they are more concerned to defend the
expression of diverse sexualities, and see pornography as an
evolving genre that holds the possibility of introducing the
alternative perspective ofwomen's power and pleasure.
Admittedly, feminists on both sides have offered
compelling arguments for their position, and the pomography
debate appears to have reached an impasse if it remains a debate
over censorship. Can we open a new dialogue on pomography
by posing a different set of questions that would situate the
debate in a more constructive phiJosophical frarnework beyond
1Robin Morgan. ttTheory and Practicc: Pomography and Rape, tt in Take
Blick fhe Night: Wornen on Pornography. editcd by Laura Ledercer (New York:
Morrow, 1980), p. 139.
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censorship? My paper attempts to explore such a possibility. In
keeping with Linda Williams' claim that pornography is
ultimately more about gender than sex2, this paper attempts to
focus the debate on gender issucs surrounding an ontological
study of the body--Le., the body as we exist it, and the body as it
is seen by the other. Ontological questions are questions that
explore the most fundamental structure of human existenee,
questions that provide the neeessary grounding for ethical
judgtnents about human rights and actions. As feminists and as
aeademies, we undoubtedly respect freedorn of expression. And
yet, for most of us, there is something deeply disturbing about the
pornographie portrayal of wornen, a portrayal so offensive that it
challenges our otherwise liberal sensibility. Rather than
dismissing this as simply a question of subjeetive taste, I suggest
that we try to analyze and to articulate just what it is that disturbs
us by reframing the pornography debate in a different
philosophieal construct, one that raises serious questions
conceming authentie human existence. In fonnulating these
questions, my frame of reference is Jean-Paul Sartre's ontology
of thc body and his theory of intersubjectivity, with special
emphasis on the phenomenon of U the look". I find the Sartrean
framework to be particularly useful in that it allows us to analyze
pomography in terms of the ontologieal eategories of freedom
and objectification. In the end, I hope to show that these are
relevant categories that will take us beyond the issue of
censorship.
Let us begin with an exposition of Sartre's ontology of
human existence, which forrns the comerstone of his theory of
embodiment. Human beings, he says, exist as freedom. Here,
freedom is to be seen ontologically as astate of being that
constitutes the very structure of our existence. As such, it is not
to be confused with the actual choices we exercise but is the very
condition for such choices. We understand that the possibility of
choice is open only to a being who exists as freedorn. Now to
exist as freedom is to exist by disobeying the principle of
identity. Unlike a rock or any nonconscious thing that has a fixed
2Linda Williams, Hard Core: Power. PleaSllre, and file uFrellzyfor the
Visible," (Berkeley: University of Califomia Press, 1989), p. 267.
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identity and is therefore nothing more than what it is, we exist by
projecting beyond our past toward some future possibility. By
realizing possibility after possibility, we are constantly pulling
away from whatever identity our past has conferred upon us, and
are·always in the process of defining and redefining ourselves.
This existential structure of wrenching away from what we are
toward what we will become is in essence a perpetual flight from
identity, which is what Sartre means when he proclaims that
human beings exist as ontological freedom. Indeed, this ontology
ofhuman existence provides us with a fundamental conception of
person that enables us to speak meaningfully and intelligibly
about concrete freedom in terms of such issues as choice and
oppression. To see this point, simply imagine what it would be
like to otTer concrete choices to a rock, or to oppress a rock by
eliminating such choices. It is absurd to ascribe concrete
freedom to a rock precisely because a rock, as a nonconscious,
congealed thing in itself, is not the sort of being that exists by
projecting beyond itself and in the process retains the pennanent
possibility of living freely. Observing the stark contrast between
persons and objects, Sartre concludes that, whereas all
nonconscious things derive their fixed identity from their solidity,
their substantiality, and their total fullness of being, a person
exists as freedom by negating all the substantial, opaque, and
thing-like qualities that cement the identity of nonconscious
objects. In this way, to exist as freedom is to be lacking in a11 the
qualities that make a thing a thing; it is to be a non-thing, a
Unothingness", as it were, whose identity remains perpetually in
flux. But given that the body, as flesh, is obviously a substantial
and solid thing with a fixed identity, how could I, as aperson, be
embodied and still exist as freedom? Sartre addresses this
problem by distinguishing three ontological dimensions of the
body, and maintaining that, in its primary dimension, my body
can never be an object for me. To be sure, he acknowledges that
my body has an "outward", impersonal dimension that emerges
for me when I apprehend it as a physical organism much like the
anonymous human body seen in an anatomy book. Now Sartre
does not deny that this dimension of the body, as an object for
me, serves a purpose; he wants only to caution that it is not how I
exist my body from day to day. Indeed, this body-as-object is
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itseJf derivative of a more immediate, primary, and authentic
dimension of my body, which Sartre calls "body as
Being-for-itself', that is to say, the body-as-subject.
In this important dimension, my body Is not split from my
conscio~sness and placed out there "in" the world. It is not itself
an object of consciousness but is precisely what consciousness
must surpass in order to take on an object. For example, while I
am painting a picture, my attention is directed solely toward the
strokes of my paint brush upon the canvas. Rather than
appearing with the canvas, the paint brush, and other objects that
lie in my field of consciousness, my body 18 the "forgotten" or
"neglected" aspect of my consciousness that is "passed over in
silence" while I engage in the pursuit of my projects. There can
be no psychic distance or split between me and my body, the kind
that is observed in any subject-to-object relation, precisely
because my body-as-subject lacks the exteriority that
characterizes all objects. Put simply, I am my body; lexist it as I
project toward my possibilities in the world. Despite Sartre's
abstract description here, this intuitive, unobjectifiable relation
between me and my body is reflected in our everyday language.
I use the sentence, "I am painting a picture", to explain my hand
movements. Indeed, it would be rather awkward, if not
altogether unintelligible, to say that my hand is painting a picture,
as ifmy hand were something different and detached from who I
am. For Sartre, it is this unobjectifiable and inseparable aspect of
my body that constitutes the most authentic and primary relation
between me and my body. lexist, he says, in complete unity
with my body-as-subject.
This unity, however, is always threatened by a third
dimension of the body, known as my body-for-others. Sartre
develops this aspect in connection with his discussion of "the
look", in which he presents his radical revision of the traditional
theory of intersubjectivity. Tbe tradition has long insisted on the
primacy of the subject-to-object relation whereby I, as subject,
become aware of the Other as object through the Other's body.
Sartre criticizes this position for failing to uncover an even more
fundamental relation: namely, my subject-to-object relation to the
Other is itself founded on the Other's tuming me into an object
through her "look". In other words, my making an object of the
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Other lies subsequent to her making an object of me (or my
awareness that she, as subject, could have made an object of me).
I become aware of the Other not through her body, but through
my own awareness that I have a body which is being looked at.
Through the Other's look, I experience the emergence ofmy own
body as an object, not for myself, but for the Other. As the
Other's privileged possession, my body-for-others is "outside my
reach, outside my action, outside my knowledge" 3. Here, Sartre
makes it plain that the Other's look represents a threat to me.
From a psychological standpoint, it exposes a dimension of my
being that is "out there" and in danger. From an ontological
standpoint, it destroys the integrity of my body and collapses my
status as freedom, as pure subject. This is what prompted Sartre
to say that "my original fall is the existence of the Other.,,4 As he
puts it,
What I apprehend immediately is that I am vulnerable,
that I have a body which can be hurt, that I occupy a
place and ...cannot...escape from the space in which am
without defense--in short, that I am seen. ...(B)eing
seen constitutes me as a defenseless being for a
freedom which is not my rreedom. It is in this sense
that we can consider ourselves as "slaves" in so far as
we appear to the Other s.
Sartre maintains that it is this terrifying awareness that compels
me to retaliate by tuming the Other into an object for me. This is
accomplished through the same mechanism: by looking back at
the look. Through this role reversal I reestablish my status as
free subject by seizing the Other as pure object existing for me
and through me. Sartre believes that this desire to rescue my
body-for-others from the Other is the ontological basis for
conflicts that often exist in concrete human relations.
) Jean-Paul Sartre, Being alld Not!lillgness, translated by Hazel E. Bames
(New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), p. 168.
4 Sartre, Being and Not!lillg/zess, p. 263.
SSartre, Being and Notlri1lgne.vs, pp. 257,267-268.
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Notice that, in Sartre's analysis of "the look", the Other is
first presented to me as a conscious subject capable of tuming me
into an objecL As the source of my objectness, the Other has to
be a subject before all else because, as Sartre says, "I cannot be
an object for an object" 6. Hence, in my encounter with the
Othcr, the üther's status as a free subject is secured first by my
awareness of being captured as an object, and then by my attempt
to undo my captivity by looking back at the look. After a11, it is
because the Other is a subject who has initially tumed me into an
object that appropriation of the Other through my look becomes
for me a desirable attitude.
The objectification of the Other would be the collapse
of his being-as-a-look. (It) is a defense on the part of
my being which, precisely by conferring on the Other a
being-for-me, frees me from my being-for-the-Other.
In the phenomenon of the look, the Other is on
principle that which cannot be an objecl. ...In
experiencing the look...! experience the inapprehensible
subjectivity of the Other directly and with my being.
At the same time I experience the Other's infinite
freedom. 7
And so even as I am trying to turn the Other into an
object-for-me, I nevertheless "experience the Other concretely as
a free, conscious subjecl.8 The other is guaranteed the ontological
status of a free subject given Sartre's theory of intersubjectivity.
It is in light of this overall ontology of freedom and
objectification that I wish to assess the problem ofpomography.
To be sure, in a patriarchal society where women-watching has
long been something of anational pastime, Sartre's analysis of
"the look" as the very destruction of a person's ontological status
as free subject affords us a useful tool to theorize about women's
compromised existence. Indeed, its relevance for feminist
6Sartrc, Beillg and Nothingness, p. 257.
'Sartre, Being and Nothillg"ess, p. 268·270
'Sartre, Being ulld NOlhi"glless, p. 271.
philosophy has been noted by Julien Murphy, who argues that:
Although Sartre does not address sexist oppression,
...his theory of "the look" is integral to a feminist
phenomenological analysis of oppression and
liberation. Without intending to, Sartre has provided us
with a particularly useful description of women's
experience of devaluation in a world where men are
dominant Q
Spccifical1y, Sartre's theory is helpful because it enables us to
reconstitute the problem of women's oppression in ontological
terms. His theory makes it elear that, within the culture of "tbe
look", wornen suffer not merely from a loss of dignity or power
but a loss of heing. Women's existence under tbe male or public
gaze is problematic not only because it leaves them powerless
but, more importantly, because it robs them oftbeir very status as
pure subjeet, as freedom, as authentie being. "The look" affinns
the freedom of the looker as subjeet at tbe expense of tbe
freedom looked-at, the person gazed upon.
If "the look" that wornen experience in their daily routine
is problernatic for the reasons discussed here, I submit that "the
look" associated with pomography is drastically more so. By
pomography, I refer to the typical variety that is ereated for tbe
heterosexual male voyeur. As the "frenzy of the visible", it
eonstitutes 'the ultimate objectification of the female body.
Whereas "the look" is experieneed as a threat under ordinary
eircumstances, ,in the most exaggerated fonn that one would find
in pornography it represents not merely the total destruction, but
the very preclusion of tbe woman as free subjecl. As "the look"
of the most radical kind, pomography is tbe attempt to deny
woman's being as free subject without ever affinning it. To
demonstrate this point, let us turn to tbe following considerations.
We have seen in Sartre's analysis of "the look" tbat the
Other is first presented to me as a subjeet before she could be
turned into an objecl. But this is not typically the ease in
pomography. Unlike any Other, the woman as Other in
9Julien Murphy, UThe Look in Sartre and Rich," in Hypatia, vo1. 2, no. 2,
Summer, 1956, p. 113.
pomography does not cast the initial look which would secure her
as tnomentary subjecl. Constructed as pure object from the start,
she exists as a reified body, with no possibility of looking or
looking back at the voyeur. The usual, albeit combative,
juxtaposition between the self and ather, between subject and
object, that is found in the reciprocal look is altogether absent in
pomography. As the designated subject, the voyeur looks
without being looked at: his onto]ogical status as subject remains
uncomprornised so long as the Other is incapable of directing that
menacing glance. Being a voyeur thus shields hirn from the
threat of becoming an object for the ather, the kind of threat
which he may feel in his own inadequate relationship with
women, and from which he may have tumed to pomography as
an escape.
Notice that, while retaining his status as guaranteed subject
before the Other, the voyeur cou]d take on his own body as an
object for himself. In the case of arousal, for instance, the voyeur
could remain a subject who could no longer surpass his body but
becomes aware of it as an object of pleasure. In this way he
exists as the symbolic union of subject and object, which,
according to Sartre, satisfies, if only artificially, the basic
ontological desire among human beings to identify with the full
positivity of a congealed thing without giving up our status as
freedom and as nothingness. We want to have it both ways: to
deny the necessary contingency that freedom brings without
denying our freedom. This bad faith project to become a
"freedom-thingtt is the source of many of the conflicts found in
interpersonal relationships. What is different in the voyeur's case
is that he manages to become an object for himself, not through
the Other's look, which would make hirn a body-for-others, but
through his own look that is directed toward the Other, seizing
the Other as a body. This puts the voyeur in a privileged
position: he becomes a body precisely by objectifying the ather,
without ever being objectified by the Other. To be sure, the
voyeur's project of being an object for himself and a subject
vis-a-vis the Other is canied out at the expense of the wornan as
Other. She exists in a structure in which her whole being is
reduced to an inert body that is solicited, probed, scrutinized, and
appropriated by the gazer.
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But now, one rnay ask, how is the objectification of
wornen in pomography different from other fonns of
objectification? Unlike other genres, such as film and television,
that also portray woman as the Other, pomography further places
the woman outside the subject in so far as she is not intended to
be taken as a character with quaJities we generally associate with
a subject, such as having a history, a personality, or various
meaningful relationships. In Sartrean 1anguage, the woman in
pomography does not exist her body--she exists os a body, and a
very impersona/ body at that. Indeed, no other fonn of
objectification betrays the subjectivity of woman quite the way
pomography does. The voyeur puts himself in a detached
position where he could glean nothing from the woman's empty
images that would compel hirn to care about her, or even to
remember her name or her face. As the impersonal body whose
only reason for being is to be seen and to be possessed, the
wornan is the antithesis of the free subject who exists by
transeending her body toward her own possibilities.
Precisely because the wornan is never a particular subject,
pornography does not objeetify a woman but the idea of woman.
As such, pomography is reallyabout the objectification of a11
wornen, tuming them from free subjects who exist their bodies
into reified objects that exist only as bodies. If to be human is to
exist as freedom, and if to exist as freedom is to exist as
transcendence into the world of possibilities by surpassing one's
body, then pomography reverses the authentic body-as-subject
relationship that wornen are supposed to have with their own
bodies. All told, in pomography, wornen suffer, above aIl else,
from a 10ss of being.
In closing, I want to discuss how these ontological
considerations eould infonn our ethical judgment about
pomography. By providing thc philosophical grounding for
understanding pornographie objectification as the destruetion of a
person's being, we have opened up a new dialogue that takes the
current pomography debate beyond censorship in at least two
ways. First, in light of the ontological description of what it
means to be human, pomography is no longer rnerely a question
of personal taste or aesthetics as some critics have alleged, but a
question of authenticity. Pomography is objectionable not
12(,
because some of us believe that its images of women are too
cmde or explicit or obscene, but because it robs women, a11
women, of their being as free subjects. Second, by predicating
the debate on ontology, we have effectively obviated the burden
on the side ofanti-pomography feminists to prove harm, an effort
dismissed by anti-censorship feminists as patemalistic. After all,
why· should we assume that women need to be protected? The
ontological considerations explored in this paper make clear that
it is not so much a question of whether women are helpless and
hence require protection, as it is a question of how human beings
ought to be treated. We respect a person by affirming her status
as free, conscious subject who transcends her body toward her
freely chosen projects. Notice that, in saying that pomography
ontologically displaces the woman as subject, my argument does
not imply that all pomography is necessarily inauthentic. Rather,
it issues a chal1enge to anti-censorship feminists who are
intcrested in working toward a feminist "re-vision" of
pomography. I submit that, ultimately, the challenge is whether
or not it is possible to secure people's status as free subjects
within the context of "the look".
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